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The recent judgment in Baljinder Kaur Nangal Chopra v. Alfa Laval India Pvt. Ltd. [2026 SCC OnLine Bom 2629] has created a difficulty for employers who may choose to take a sympathetic approach to delinquent workmen and terminate their employment ‘without stigma’ i.e. termination without referring to any grounds of misconduct and dehors an enquiry. Such terminations, when challenged, are now, in a sense, absolute, as the employer cannot substantiate the termination by placing on record the actual grounds of misconduct (which are not reflected in the termination letter). The Court inter alia primarily relied upon earlier single bench judgments in Wai Taluka Sahakari Kharedi Vikri Sangh v. Shn Bajirao Mahadeo, 1992 (1) CLR 637 [In absence of enquiry and charge sheet, employer cannot justify termination by leading evidence] and Prakash Mahadev Nigampurkar v. Premier Automobiles Ltd., (1995) 2 LLN 373 : 1996 (71) FLR 435 [Labour Court cannot go beyond foundation of dismissal order].

In Baljinder’s case the petitioner was terminated by a simple order without any assigned reasons or misconduct allegations on June 19, 2020. The respondent initially defended the termination on the sole ground that the petitioner was not a “workman”. Four years later, after the trial had substantially advanced (the preliminary issue declaring the petitioner a “workman” was decided, and an affidavit-in-chief was filed), the respondent-employer attempted to amend its written statement to introduce serious allegations of misconduct. The Labour Court under the Maharashtra Recognition of Trade Unions and Prevention of Unfair Labour Practices Act, 1971 [MRTU & PULP Act, 1971] rejected the amendment, but the Industrial Court allowed it, which prompted this writ petition. The High Court ruled that permitting the amendment would unlawfully alter the foundational termination order from a simple discharge into a punitive one, substantially changing the nature of the proceedings. The Court emphasized that a termination order cannot be supplemented with new allegations years later when the initial action was silent and no prior disciplinary inquiry was held.

Furthermore, the respondent failed to show due diligence under the proviso to Order VI Rule 17 (as amended) of the Civil Procedure Code, as the alleged facts were known since 2020 hence the amendment application to permit the introduction of new charges was not allowed as trial had already begun. The High Court allowed the writ petition, quashed the Industrial Court’s order, and restored the Labour Court’s decision rejecting the amendment. The Labour Court was directed to proceed expeditiously without the newly introduced misconduct allegations.

There are various issues with this judgment primarily, termination in labour disputes are not interpreted in the same manner as a termination order of a quasi-judicial authority in public service law of probationary officers or dead wood officers nearing the end of their tenure, which cannot be improved upon nor a non-stigmatic termination be turned into a stigmatic one nor new charges be permitted to be added in appeal. Unfortunately, the judgment blurs the line between these two streams of employment law.

Thus, in Workmen of M/S. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Management, (1973) 1 SCC 813 the Supreme Court recognised that it is possible for an employer in industrial adjudication to brings relevant and essential facts on record for the first time for determining the real controversy. The proposed amendment in this case similarly sought to place relevant facts concerning the workman’s duties, performance and circumstances preceding termination on record and was directly connected with the dispute already pending before the Labour Court.

In Workmen of M/S. Firestone Tyre and Rubber Co. v. Management, (1973) 1 SCC 813 the Supreme Court recognised that if the employer is not allowed to lead additional evidence then in that case, another industrial dispute would arise and the employer would be entitled to rely upon the enquiry which he had held in the mean-time. This course would mean delay and on the second occasion it will entitle the employer to claim the benefit of the domestic enquiry given while subjecting the employee to another proceeding. On the other hand, if in such cases the employer is given an opportunity to justify the impugned dismissal on the merits of his case being considered by the labour tribunal for itself and that clearly would be to the benefit of the employee. It expressly equated a case where no enquiry is held with a case where enquiry is held.

There is no reason why this principle could not and ought not to apply to a termination simplicitor without stigma when challenged, as otherwise it only means another termination process required to be undergone by the employer and workmen.

Thus, the Supreme Court in United Bank Of India v. Tamil Nadu Banks Deposit Collectors Union, 2007 (12) SCC 585 applied the Firestone principles even in cases where there was ‘no ground of termination disclosed in the termination letter’.

Similarly, a division bench of the Bombay High Court in Vajidali T. Kadri v. D D Shah, [2007 (6) MahLJ 650 : (2008) 1 LLJ 790 : (2008) 116 FLR 312] applied the Firestone principles in case of a dismissal simplicitor in respect of disputes under MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 and approved the Single judge’s judgment in D D Shah v. Vajidali T. Kadri, [2007 (1) CLR 913] which expressly distinguished and refused to follow the judgment in Wai Taluka’s case. However, neither the Supreme Court and Division Bench orders of the High Court were cited by either side in Baljinder’s case.

Further, the reasoning adopted in the impugned judgment is particularly difficult to sustain in view of the amended Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, which bars amendment after trial has begun in a civil suit in absence of due diligence, is not amongst the specific provisions of CPC made applicable to Labour Courts since 2019 vide Rule 104 of the Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure) Rules, 1975 framed under the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. The impugned judgment, however, has proceeded principally by applying the restrictive principles under Order VI Rule 17 CPC, without adequately considering the specific statutory rules governing industrial proceedings under the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971. Though it must be pointed out that this Rule seems to have not been placed on record by either party.

Rule 104 inserted in 2019 provides, – “Wherever the provisions under the MRTU & PULP Act 1971 and the Labour Courts (Practise and Procedure) Rules 1975 are silent, the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure under Sections 27 to 32, read with Orders XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XVI, XVI-A, XVIII, and XIX, shall be applicable to the proceedings under the MRTU & PULP Act 1971.”

Thus, the strict application of the amended Order VI Rule 17 of CPC, which bars amendment after trial has begun in a civil suit, is not amongst the specific provisions of CPC made applicable to Labour Courts since 2019 vide Rule 104 of the Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure) Rules, 1975 framed under the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971.

In the Author’s view the Labour Court as a quasi-judicial tribunal was not bound by strict rules of procedure and rightly permitted the amendment to allow the real dispute to be adjudicated in view of Section 29(4) and 32 of the MRTU & PULP Act, 1971 r/w Rule 46-B, 46-C(8), 103 of the Labour Courts (Practice & Procedure) Rules, 1975, as otherwise it would inevitably mean that the employer will now have to immediately proceed to hold the enquiry and pass an order dismissing the employee once again and this will result in multiplicity of proceedings which is frowned upon in the Firestone principles. In the Author’s view only further cases will shed light on the correctness of the view taken by the Hon’ble High Court in Baljinder’s case.

It cannot correctly be said that the petitioner workman has acquiesced in an order of termination simpliciter, that is, one unaccompanied by any imputation of misconduct. On the contrary, both parties are now equally dissatisfied with what was conceived as a sympathetic middle course between the two.

Where such an order is impugned, the employer is left with no option but to adduce evidence of the alleged misconduct, if permitted to do so by the adjudicating authority. Conversely, if the employer is wholly precluded from leading such evidence, and is consequently unable to justify the termination on any independent ground when it is called into question, the practice of termination without stigma may, in practical terms, cease to survive. Either eventuality would occasion a grave detriment to workmen and employers alike.

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-Suraj Chaudhary, Advocate Bombay High Court