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The Indian regulatory landscape for financial markets, pensions, insurance and competition is anchored in four core sectoral regulators: the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority (PFRDA), the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India (IRDAI) and the Competition Commission of India (CCI). Each of these bodies is vested with a complex mix of legislative, executive and quasi-judicial powers. This article undertakes a comparative analysis of their quasi-judicial and related powers, with particular reference to their statutory frameworks, the nature and scope of adjudicatory functions, procedural standards, appellate mechanisms and key doctrinal and practical distinctions.

SEBI and CCI engage in relatively high-volume, high-visibility enforcement, with a steady stream of published orders, public directions and appellate decisions. IRDAI’s enforcement is significant but tends to be more supervisory and less publicly adversarial. PFRDA’s enforcement footprint remains comparatively modest, though likely to grow with the expanding pension sector. The density of jurisprudence is thus greatest in securities and competition law. (Other central regulators such as Telecom Regulatory Authority of India  [TRAI], etc, are not considered as they are not as prolific in exercise of their quasi-judicial powers as compared to these four.)

SEBI, PFRDA, IRDAI and CCI are all statutory regulators, but they differ in origin, sectoral remit and institutional design. These differences inform both the form and intensity of their quasi-judicial powers.

• SEBI is constituted under the Securities and Exchange Board of India Act, 1992 (SEBI Act). While originally an executive regulator, subsequent amendments, particularly post the securities market scams of the 1990s and early 2000s, have significantly augmented its enforcement and adjudicatory powers.
• PFRDA is established by the Pension Fund Regulatory and Development Authority Act, 2013 (PFRDA Act). It regulates the National Pension System and other pension schemes not governed by separate statutes, with a relatively nascent but evolving enforcement architecture.
• IRDAI derives its authority from the Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority of India Act, 1999 (IRDAI Act), read with the Insurance Act, 1938 and allied legislation. It supervises insurers, intermediaries and distribution channels, with its quasi-judicial role embedded in both the parent and sectoral statutes.
• CCI is constituted under the Competition Act, 2002 (Competition Act). Unlike the financial regulators, it is predominantly conceived as a specialised adjudicatory authority to prevent anti-competitive conduct, regulate combinations and protect competition in markets.

All four are independent statutory bodies, though subject to judicial review by constitutional courts and appellate forums. Their quasi-judicial powers typically derive from explicit provisions authorising investigation, inquiry, adjudication, imposition of penalties and issuance of binding directions.

SEBI, PFRDA and IRDAI broadly follow an administrative adjudication model:

• Show-cause and reply: Proceedings are ordinarily initiated through a show-cause notice specifying alleged violations and proposed action, followed by a written reply from the noticee.
• Hearing: Personal hearings are conducted, often by whole-time members, adjudicating officers or designated officials. Representation through counsel is generally permitted.
• Evidence and record: The regulators rely on documentary evidence, inspection reports, market intelligence and, where relevant, witness statements or expert reports. Cross-examination may be sought but is not an absolute right; denial must be justified.
• Reasoned orders: Final orders are required to be reasoned, dealing with the pleadings, evidence and legal submissions, and must demonstrate proportionality in the choice of sanction.

Judicial scrutiny has repeatedly emphasised that, notwithstanding their regulatory mandate, these authorities act as quasi-judicial bodies when imposing penalties or significant civil consequences, and must therefore follow fair procedure. SEBI, PFRDA and IRDAI orders are appealable to the Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT) formed under the SEBI Act. Under the Competition Act, appeals from CCI lie to the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT). NCLAT examines both factual and legal issues, exercising a relatively intensive review over CCI’s findings, including in relation to economic analysis, subject to deference for specialised expertise. NCLAT’s decisions are appealable to the Supreme Court on questions of law.  This is in addition to oversight of constitutional courts over their adminsitrative, quasi-judicial and delegated rule making function.

Whereas, CCI follows a two-stage process combining investigation and adjudication:

• Investigation by Director General: Upon forming a prima facie opinion, CCI directs the Director General (DG) to investigate. The DG’s investigation is inquisitorial and may involve extensive information-gathering, search and seizure (with appropriate warrants) and examination of witnesses.
• Adjudication by CCI: The DG’s report is placed before CCI, which then conducts adversarial hearings where parties can inspect records (subject to confidentiality), file objections and rejoinders, lead and challenge evidence and make oral submissions.
• High due process standards: The Supreme Court and appellate tribunals have consistently required CCI to maintain clear separation between investigative and adjudicatory functions, ensure full disclosure (with limited confidentiality carve-outs), and give parties meaningful opportunity to contest the DG’s findings.
• CCI stands out for its formal separation between investigation (DG) and adjudication (Commission), although both are part of the same statutory framework. SEBI, PFRDA and IRDAI integrate investigative and adjudicatory functions more closely within the authority, with internal segregation through different departments or officers rather than structurally distinct agencies. This raises recurring debates about impartiality and the need for clearer firewalls as officers move across departments often and departments communicate and informally influence each other’s cases.

Procedurally, therefore, CCI’s model is closer to that of a civil court or specialised tribunal than a purely administrative regulator, although it remains an expert body with considerable discretion in market analysis and economic assessment.

The interface with criminal law between these regulators varies. SEBI has explicit provisions for prosecution in serious cases, in addition to monetary penalties, and insider trading and fraud provisions often straddle the boundary between civil and criminal enforcement. IRDAI and PFRDA use criminal prosecution more sparingly. Under the Competition Act, certain non-compliances (such as failure to comply with orders or directions) may attract criminal consequences, but core substantive violations are generally addressed through civil penalties and remedies. This impacts the procedural expectations placed on each regulator: the closer the consequences approximate criminal sanctions, the more exacting the required standard of fairness.

Settlement process: SEBI has a detailed settlement and compounding framework, which allows resolution of certain proceedings without admission of guilt, subject to safeguards. CCI has developed leniency and settlement models (notably in cartel cases) to facilitate enforcement through cooperation. IRDAI and PFRDA rely more heavily on supervisory dialogue and corrective action plans, with fewer formalised settlement mechanisms. These differences influence how quasi-judicial powers are actually deployed in practice, with some matters resolved without culminating in fully contested orders.

A comparison chart of their quasi-judicial & related powers is provided below, viz., –

	SEBI* (securities market regulator & sectoral regulator for intermediaries)	PFRDA (pension fund market regulator & sectoral regulator for intermediaries)	IRDAI (insurance market regulator & sectoral regulator for intermediaries)	CCI (economy-wide regulator)
Power to suspend and cancel registration of intermediaries	Section 12 of SEBI Act- power to suspend or cancel registration   [In addition to this SEBI grants ‘recognition’ to Stock Exchanges and Clearing Corporations under the Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956]	Section 27 of PFRDA Act- power to suspend or cancel registration	Sec 14 IRDA Act- power to suspend and cancel registration r/w Section 3 of Insurance Act	—no concept of intermediaries—-
Power to direct audit, inspection, investigation	Section 11 of SEBI Act power to call for information, audit, inspect intermediaries, persons connected with securities market   Section 11C  of SEBI Act power to investigate     No concept of calling objections	Section 14 PFRDA Act empowers power to call for information, audit, investigate, inspection, intermediaries, and persons connected with pension funds   Section 16 relating to Investigating Authority modelled on Section 11C of SEBI Act [except search and seizure which is u/s 17]   No concept of calling objections	Section 14 IRDA Act power to call for information from, inspect, audit, investigate insurers, intermediaries and other organisations connected with insurance business r/w Section 33 of Insurance Act   All expenses of inspection and investigation are recovered from the entity investigated.   No concept of calling objections	Essentially, an inquiry is initially conducted by the CCI either upon receipt of a reference or its own knowledge or information received u/s 19 or 20. The Commission has to come to a prima facie opinion that a case exists and once it comes to such conclusion it directs the DG to conduct an investigation.     Section 26 Power to investigate or conduct inquiry of anti-competitive agreement and abuse of dominant position by enterprises and further investigate or conduct inquiry by the Director General of the CCI. If investigation recommends no violation then objections are invited from various persons, including government and only thereafter case is closed.   Section 29 power to investigate combinations which have adverse effect on competition by calling report from Director General and inviting comments and objections to the said report.   Director General powers provided u/s 41
Power to decide disputes between regulated entities	—–	Section 14 PFRDA Act power to decide disputes between subscribers and intermediaries	Section 14 IRDA Act power to decide disputes between insurers and intermediaries	—-
Power to issue interim directions, including ex-parte interim	Section 11(4) permits issuance of direction pre, during and post investigation inquiry	Similar to SEBI Act, Section 14(4) of PFRDA Act power to issue directions pre, during and posy investigation and inquiry, including impounding and attachment, restrain persons from participating in scheme   Section 31 of PFRDA Act enables any aggrieved persons to apply for interim protection measures, including for securing assets and sale thereof	Section 33(6) of Insurance Act permits issuance of directions to insurer post report of investigation authority after opportunity of representation.	Section 33 empowers interim orders in case of violation relating to anti-competitive agreement, abuse of dominant position and combinations,
Power to issue general as well as quasi-judicial directions	Power to issue directions, both general and specific (including quasi-judicial) u/s 11, 11A, 11B, 11D	Power to issue directions post inquiry u/s 15 modelled on Section 11B of SEBI Act	Power to issue directions, both general and specific (including quasi-judicial) u/s 34 of Insurance Act   Power to remove person from managerial position/ appoint suitable replacement in insurer u/s 34B of Insurance Act   Power to appoint additional directors in insurer u/s 34C of Insurance Act   However, specific directions can only be issued post hearing to insurer or managerial person	Section 27 and 28 empowers quasi-judicial directions to entities in relation to anti-competitive agreements or abuse of dominant position   Section 29A to 31 for orders against combinations.   CCI can order modification or discontinuance of agreements, impose behavioural remedies, and in combination cases require divestiture or structural changes.
Search and seizure	Section 11C requires approval of Designated Court for search and seizure by Investigating Authority   No concept of hearing objections by Designated Court, could be implied	Section 17 enables PFRDA to authorise any Gazetted Officer to conduct search and seizure, no need to go any court for approval	Section 34H power of search and seizure of Insurance Act by any subordinate officer not below rank of Deputy Director authorized by Chairman of IRDA, no approval of any court   All objections to approval and return of seized material heard by SAT	Section 41 empowers Director General to conduct search and seizure after approval by CMM, Delhi anywhere in India
Penalty provisions	Chapter VI-A of SEBI Act penalty provisions levied by AO or by Board u/s 11 upto 25 crores and five times the profit, whichever is more	Section 28 provides for penalties upto one crore and five times profit whichever is more	Section 2CB, 34B, 40, 41, 42, 42D, 52F, 102 to 105D of Insurance Act penalty from 1 lakh per day to 25 crores by AO	Section 27 provides for levy of penalty upto 10% of turnover or income for last 3 years in case of abuse of dominant position and in cartelisation cases, up to three times the profit or ten per cent of turnover, whichever is higher.     Section 42 and 43 provides for civil penalty of upto a crore for violation orders of commission or DG   Section 43A to 45 alos provide for various penalties upto a crore or 1 percent of turnover
Delegation	Quasi-judicial power is delegated u/s 19 of SEBI Act  to a singular member or officer, as the case may be	Quasi-judicial power is delegated u/s 49 of PFRDA to a singular member or officer, as the case may be	Quasi-judicial power is delegated u/s 23 of IRDA Act and 110A of Insurance Act to a singular member or officer, as the case may be	CCI functions as a multi-member adjudicatory body. No power to delegate quasi-judicial power, all decisions are by the commission sitting together and decisions are by majority u/s 22 and subject to minimum quorum of 3 of same persons which cannot change midway Regulation 3A of CCI (Meeting for Transaction of Business) Regulations, 2009 as amended in 2021
Penalty procedure	Securities and Exchange Board of India (Procedure for Holding Inquiry and Imposing Penalties) Rules, 1995 provides procedure for levy of penalty by AO or Board u/s 15-I	Section 28 vests penalty power in the member of the PFRDA, the adjudicating officer is appointed only to hold an inquiry and submit a report, the penalty is levied by the member not the AO.   The Adjudicating Officer does not actually do any adjudication, he conducts only an enquiry and submits a report   PFRDA (Procedure for inquiry by adjudicating officer) Regulations, 2015	Insurance (Procedure for Holding Inquiry by Adjudicating Officer) Rules, 2016 provide for similar procedure for levy of penalty by AO	Detailed rules of procedure u/s 36 and the CCI (General Regulations), 2024
Disgorgement/Restitution	Power of disgorgement directly exercised by the Board u/s 11, 11B of SEBI Act	—-	Section 106 of Insurance Act power to apply to court for restitution of unlawfully retained property by insurer or policy holder   Power of interim attachment for 3 months of such property which is liable to be restituted u/s 106 is vested with an Administrator appointed  qua an insurer; which can be made extended by application made to SAT   2025 Amendment to the Insurance Act, 1938 to section 34 regulator IRDAI now has the power to force insurers and intermediaries to surrender (disgorge) any illegal profits or wrongful gains resulting from regulatory violations. This matches the enforcement capabilities of other financial watchdogs (like SEBI) and provides a stronger shield for policyholders.	Section 42A enables any person affected by an enterprise in violation of CCI orders to seek compensation by making an application to appellate tribunal
Recovery mechanism	Recovery officer mechanism of IT act adopted	—-	All penalties recoverable as arrears of land revenue	Reference u/s 39 is made to Income Tax Authorities who recover the same on behalf of the CCI
Settlement	SEBI (Settlement Proceedings) Regulations, 2018 u/s 15JB of SEBI Act	—–	—–	Section 46 provides for imposition of lesser penalty in respect of those persons who make a full disclosure and help in the investigation but not after investigation under CCI (Lesser Penalty) Regulations, 2024.   Section 48A provides for settlement with a person who has violated the act in respect of proceedings which have already been initiated after investigation. Third party objections are invited before settlement is agreed to under CCI (Settlement) Regulations 2024.   In case of inquiry u/s 26 the CCI can accept commitments voluntarily made u/s 48B to avoid further full blown investigation.

SEBI, PFRDA, IRDAI and CCI occupy central positions in India’s regulatory state, exercising wide-ranging quasi-judicial powers that significantly affect market participants, consumers and the broader economy. They represent distinct but converging models of expert, quasi-judicial regulation in India. Their statutory frameworks, quasi-judicial powers and appellate structures reflect a balancing of regulatory effectiveness, market confidence and procedural fairness.

While they share core administrative law obligations of fairness, transparency and proportionality, their statutory bases, institutional designs and enforcement cultures generate meaningful differences in how quasi-judicial authority is conceptualised and exercised.  As financial markets deepen and competition issues grow more complex, the quasi-judicial roles of these regulators will continue to be sites of significant doctrinal and policy development.

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– Suraj Surjit Chaudhary, Advocate, Bombay High Court